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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The electric power industry is in the midst of spectacular change.1 
Deregulatory efforts have moved the industry into a state of transi-
tion from a highly regulated era to one marked by increased competi-
tion.2 This transition era has brought numerous procompetitive 
changes to the industry, including, for example, increased competi-
tion in wholesale and retail markets and a move away from cost-
based ratemaking to market-based standards.3 These changes are 
profoundly important for their impact on the application of antitrust 
principles in a deregulated electric power industry. This Comment 
examines the changes deregulation has brought on the applicability 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Florida State University College of Law. I am espe-
cially grateful to Professor Jim Rossi for suggesting this topic and for offering valuable 
comments and suggestions on previous drafts. Thanks to Jason Feder, Andy George, Scott 
Cochran, and Jennifer Shelfer for their editorial assistance. Special thanks to Erin Strong 
for her enthusiasm and many helpful discussions. Any errors within are my own. 
 1. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in 
the U.S. Electricity Sector, 11 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1997, 119, at 119 (“[D]ramatic 
changes are now taking place in the structure of electric power sectors around the world.”). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Part IV. 
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of one antitrust claim important to the electric power industry—the 
price squeeze.4 
 Suppose a vertically integrated firm sells electricity at wholesale 
and retail.5 Both the firm’s wholesale and retail rates are regulated: 
the former at the national level by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), the latter by respective state public utility 
commissions. The vertically integrated utility services fifty towns in 
a given state. The distribution systems in forty of the towns are 
owned by the utility; in the others, the town itself owns the system. 
In areas where the town itself owns the distribution system, the town 
provides retail service to customers while purchasing the electricity 
wholesale from the utility; in areas where the utility owns the distri-
bution system, it provides retail service at rates set by the state.  
 Suppose further that the integrated utility requests and receives a 
rate increase from FERC for the sale of electricity at wholesale but, 
for whatever reason, does not request (or does not obtain) a similar 
increase from the state commission for the sale of electricity at retail. 
As a result of the increase in wholesale rates, the towns providing 
their own retail service are forced to raise retail rates (which, in the 
case of municipalities, are not regulated) in order to continue to cover 
costs or maintain existing profit levels. Meanwhile, retail rates 
charged in the other forty towns do not rise. As a result, mobile firms 
and consumers take up residence in one of the towns where the util-
ity provides retail service in order to take advantage of lower rates. 
The towns owning their own distribution systems suffer lost profits, 
perhaps to the point where it is difficult to cover costs.  
 The hypothetical just advanced evinces a common situational set-
ting in the electric power industry. The allegation made against the 
integrated utility under such circumstances is one of antitrust injury 
based on the theory of price squeeze. The claim of price squeeze in 
the context of electric power has been examined by the courts6 and 
well analyzed in the literature.7 But these investigations of the price 
squeeze in the electric power context are dependent on characteris-
tics of the industry that are no longer necessarily reflective of the 
setting that is increasingly facing antitrust courts and those con-
cerned generally with the regulation of electric power. The electric 
power industry is in a state of transition from an era marked by tra-
ditional cost-of-service ratemaking and pervasive regulation to a de-
regulatory environment characterized by restructuring and a move to 
                                                                                                                    
 4. For a description of the price squeeze, see infra Part III. 
 5. The following hypothetical draws its facts from Town of Concord v. Boston Edison 
Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).  
 6. See infra Part III.  
 7. See John E. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause of 
Action, 31 UCLA L. REV. 563 (1984).  
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market-based ratemaking for wholesale transactions.8 As wholesale 
deregulation becomes the norm, antitrust courts will have to recon-
sider the role of price squeeze claims in antitrust suits brought 
against integrated utilities.  
 This Comment takes a first cut at analyzing price squeeze claims 
arising in a deregulated electric power industry. Part II provides an 
introduction to the electric power industry, details some of the impor-
tant structural deregulatory developments that have had an impact 
on the industry, and discusses the situational factors that give rise to 
a claim of price squeeze. Part III sets out a theory of the price 
squeeze. It explains that the factors giving rise to a claim of price 
squeeze generally are rarely of concern to antitrust courts and are of-
ten procompetitive; therefore, courts must be skeptical of the claim. 
Part III then extends the discussion of the price squeeze to the con-
text of electric power specifically and examines the leading cases ad-
dressing the theory in the context of electric power. As this discus-
sion shows, the courts, generally consistent with the theory of the 
price squeeze developed in the beginning of Part III, have been skep-
tical of the claim in the context of electric power. Part IV analyzes 
the application of the price squeeze claim in a deregulated electric 
power industry. Bringing together the restructuring of the industry 
and the deregulation of wholesale rates, Part IV attempts to juxta-
pose changes in electric power with an applicable approach to analyz-
ing the price squeeze claim. Part IV further argues that prevailing on 
a theory of price squeeze in the electric power context will likely be 
even more difficult for plaintiffs as wholesale deregulation increas-
ingly becomes the norm in electric power. Part V concludes the 
Comment.  
II.   RESTRUCTURING IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 
A.   Industry Basics 
 The electric power industry can be divided into three parts: gen-
eration, transmission, and distribution.9 Generation is the process of 
producing electricity.10 The transmission system transfers the elec-
tricity from the generating facility.11 The distribution system com-
pletes the transfer of electricity to the end user.12 Traditionally, a 
                                                                                                                    
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
654-57 (2000). 
 10. See id. at 654-55. 
 11. See id. at 656-57. 
 12. See id. at 657. 
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vertically integrated firm provided each of these services.13 Vertical 
integration was the norm in the electric power industry because of 
the widely held belief that economies of scale—declining average 
costs over given periods of production—were present at the genera-
tion and distribution stages.14 Because of the belief that electric 
power could be provided most efficiently in any given area by a single 
vertically integrated firm, the electric utility was viewed as a natural 
monopoly and was regulated as such by state agencies.15 Under this 
regulatory regime, the electric utility was granted an exclusive ser-
vice territory in exchange for having its prices set by state regula-
tors.16 Moreover, the utility agreed to provide service to any customer 
located within the relevant service jurisdiction.17  
 The electric power industry is in a state of transition from an era 
of pervasive regulation to one marked by increased competition. 
Technological innovation has led economists to suggest that the gen-
eration system has lost most of its economies of scale.18 This recogni-
tion has led to efforts to open generation to competition.19 Meanwhile, 
the transmission and distribution segments of the industry are still 
viewed as natural monopolies.20 Thus, movements toward competi-
tive reform in the industry have consisted in large part of attempts to 
deregulate price and remove barriers to entry in the generation sec-
tor.21 Other procompetitive reforms in the industry include attempts 
at the state level to increase competition in retail markets, and at-
tempts by both FERC and various state commissions to shift rate-
making away from the traditional cost-of-service paradigm to one 
guided by market forces.22 
 The Federal Power Act23 grants FERC regulatory authority over 
the transmission and wholesale purchase of electric power in inter-
                                                                                                                    
 13. See Suedeen G. Kelly, Electricity, in ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 12-7 (2000). 
 14. See David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, The Measurement of Vertical Economies 
and the Efficient Structure of the Electric Utility Industry, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 483 (1991). 
 15. LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., AMERICA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE 4 (7th ed. 2000). 
 16. See id.  
 17. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in 
an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1236 
(1998) (noting that the common law and statutory-based “duty to serve” was primarily in-
voked as a condition on the utility’s monopoly franchise).  
 18. See, e.g., PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE 
COMPETITIVE ERA 4 (1997) (noting a general consensus); Matthew W. White et al., Power 
Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets, in BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 201, 202 (1996). 
 19. See Joskow, supra note 1, at 119. 
 20. See White et al., supra note 18, at 202. 
 21. See id.  
 22. See infra Part IV.  
 23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (2000).  
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state commerce.24 The Federal Power Act reserves most intrastate 
matters concerning the sale and resale of electric power to the 
states.25 Pursuant to Congress’s dual federalism-styled regulatory 
framework set forth in the Federal Power Act, ratemaking for the 
electric power industry has been, and continues to be, derived from 
two sources. Transactions concerning interstate wholesale purchases 
are governed by rates set by FERC, while intrastate transactions, in-
cluding most retail transactions, are governed by rates set by the 
relevant state public utility commission. The rest of this Part dis-
cusses some of the ways rates are set by both FERC and state com-
missions and examines some of the changes currently taking place in 
both the federal and state regulatory spheres—changes that could 
have a dramatic impact on the way the price squeeze claim is ana-
lyzed. 
B.   Ratemaking 
 Traditionally, state and federal regulators have required regu-
lated utilities to offer consumers rates “that were just, reasonable, 
and non-discriminatory.”26 In accord with the traditional economic 
understanding of natural monopoly, electric utility firms’ rates were 
regulated to ensure those firms would not take advantage of their 
market dominance by reducing output or raising prices to supracom-
petitive levels.27  
 In the electric power industry, rates have conventionally been set 
based on cost of service.28 The cost-of-service paradigm attempts to 
set rates at levels designed to mirror a competitive market by allow-
ing the regulated firm to recover its cost of providing service along 
with a reasonable return on its capital investment. The derivation of 
cost-of-service ratemaking can be expressed by the formula R = O + 
(V – D)r, where R represents the regulated firm’s revenue require-
ment, O the firm’s operating costs, V the value of a firm’s property, D 
the amount of depreciation applicable to V, and r the rate of return 
allowed by the regulator.29  
                                                                                                                    
 24. Id. § 824(b)(1). 
 25. See id.  
 26. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1331 (1998). 
 27. See Robin A. Prager, Firm Behavior in Franchise Monopoly Markets, 21 RAND J. 
ECON. 211, 211 (1990) (“The traditional solution to the natural monopoly problem is to im-
pose some form of rate regulation.”). 
 28. See Peter Fox-Penner et al., Competition in Wholesale Electric Power Markets, 23 
ENERGY L.J. 281, 281 (2002) (recognizing the historical dominance of cost-of-service-based 
ratemaking in the electric power industry). 
 29. CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 177 (3d ed. 1993). The formula is often expressed without reference to adjust-
ment to total property value from depreciation. See, e.g., BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, 
at 507 (expressing the formula as R = B(r) + O, where the only difference is that B repre-
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 In essence, the cost-of-service ratemaking process consists of three 
steps to be undertaken by the regulator.30 First, the regulated firm’s 
operating expenses must be calculated. A firm’s operating expenses 
represent its variable costs.31 These are a firm’s largest contribution 
to the revenue requirement calculation and include expenses like 
fuel, wages, and maintenance costs.32 
 The second step is for the regulator to subtract the amount of de-
preciation from a firm’s total capital investment. A firm’s capital in-
vestment represents its fixed costs, or costs that do not vary with the 
level of production, and include, for example, the costs associated 
with building and maintaining operational facilities and acquiring 
and maintaining essential equipment.33 To be included in this calcu-
lation, the claimed asset must be “used and useful” in providing the 
services that represent the firm’s bases for being subject to regula-
tion.34 
 The third step is to determine a fair rate of return for the firm. A 
fair rate of return is said to consist of determining a regulated firm’s 
cost of capital.35 The complexities of determining the appropriate rate 
of return, though, easily outweigh its definitional simplicity.36 Not-
withstanding the complexities of the process,37 its objectives are rela-
tively straightforward: “It should be fair to investors so as to avoid 
the confiscation of their property. It should also preserve the credit 
standing of the utility to enable it to attract new capital to maintain, 
improve and expand its services in response to consumer demand.”38 
In short, as is the case with other aims of the ratemaking process, 
determining the appropriate rate of return should be done in a way 
that mimics the operation of market forces as closely as possible.  
                                                                                                                    
sents capital investment—expressed as V in the original notation—unmodified by a dis-
counting feature for depreciation).  
 30. See PHILLIPS, supra note 29, at 177 (noting that the cost-of-service “formula indi-
cates that determining the total revenue required . . . involves three major steps”).  
 31. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 507 (explaining that a firm’s operating ex-
penses “may vary with its level of production”). 
 32. See PHILLIPS, supra note 29, at 177.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. See, e.g., Claire Holton Hammond, An Overview of Electric Utility Regulation, in 
ELECTRIC POWER: DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 31, 50 (John C. Moorhouse 
ed., 1986). 
 36. See id. (“[D]etermining the appropriate rate of return is a formidable task em-
broiling commissions and utilities in time-consuming disputes.”).  
 37. For a short but sufficiently detailed explanation, see Hammond, supra note 35, at 
50-52. 
 38. PHILLIPS, supra note 29, at 178. 
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C.   Rate Structure 
 After a firm’s rate of return is determined, the regulator must 
then allocate the cost-bearing function of the firm’s revenue require-
ment amongst the firm’s consumer classes.39 This process is compli-
cated, in part, by competing economic theories.40 Complications have 
been furthered in recent years by rising rates and increased competi-
tion. As explained by one of the leading commentators on the regula-
tion of public utilities, “[e]conomists . . . have contended that the tra-
ditional approach [to determining rate structure], based on average 
total or embedded cost, must be replaced with a marginal cost ap-
proach to ensure economic efficiency and promote conservation.”41 
But even the marginal cost approach is not universally favored.42 The 
economic debate over how best to formulate a firm’s rate structure 
will not be addressed further, but it is useful to understand the gen-
eral notion of rate structure.  
D.   Wholesale Competition 
 Deregulation of the electric power industry has lagged behind de-
regulation of other industries, such as airlines, gas, and telecommu-
nications.43 Numerous factors led to the implementation of restruc-
turing measures in the electric power industry. Following a period of 
declining prices, the industry began to see rising rates.44 Specifically, 
“[t]he cumulative effects of inflation, oil price shocks, and fuel prices, 
as well as the onset of environmental regulation, led to consistent in-
creases in the costs of producing power from traditional generation 
facilities.”45 Successful restructuring efforts in natural gas also en-
couraged the electric power industry to experiment with restructur-
ing.46  
1.   Toward Competition in Electric Power 
 Wholesale markets began transitioning to more competitive mar-
kets in 1978 with Congress’s passage of the Public Utilities Regula-
tory Policy Act (PURPA).47 Authorizing FERC to command wheeling 
                                                                                                                    
 39. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 556.  
 40. See Lopatka, supra note 7, at 577-85 (discussing these competing economic theo-
ries in some detail).  
 41. PHILLIPS, supra note 29, at 180.  
 42. See id.  
 43. See Elisabeth Pendley, Deregulation of the Energy Industry, 31 LAND & WATER L. 
REV. 27, 60 (1996). 
 44. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 1276. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets 
in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, 324-25 (1994). 
 47. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-1 to a-3, 824i-k, 2601-2645 (1994)).  
232  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:225 
 
for wholesale customers and suppliers was, perhaps, PURPA’s most 
significant provision for advancing the electric power industry’s re-
structuring efforts.48 Ultimately, restrictive agency and judicial in-
terpretations limited PURPA’s impact on the competitive restructur-
ing of the industry.49 It has been suggested, though, that despite the 
constrictive interpretation of PURPA, its enactment may have had 
some procompetitive impact on the industry. For example, “the 
threat of compulsory wheeling may have nudged utilities to negotiate 
voluntary transmission agreements with other suppliers and whole-
sale customers.”50 Moreover, PURPA laid the foundation for inde-
pendent firms to enter the generation market, providing competition 
for the traditional integrated provider.51 
2.   The Beginning of Open Access 
 The next significant boost to the electric power industry’s restruc-
turing efforts came in response to heightened concern for energy is-
sues following the United States’ involvement in Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, with passage of the Energy Policy Act of 
1992 (“EPAct”).52 Among other changes brought by the EPAct,53 Con-
gress granted FERC greater authority to order wholesale transmis-
sion access.54 Specifically, the EPAct authorizes any electric power 
firm participating in wholesale markets “to apply to FERC for issu-
ance of an order requiring a ‘transmitting utility’ to provide wheeling 
services, including any enlargement of transmission capacity neces-
sary to provide the service requested by the applicants.”55 FERC, 
then, “is authorized to grant the application and order a transmis-
sion facility owner to provide the applicant with the requested ser-
vice on fair terms.”56 
 The EPAct also responds to PURPA’s limitations concerning open-
ing power generation to competitive forces by encouraging independ-
                                                                                                                    
 48. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 719 (describing this provision). The “wheeling” 
of electric power refers to its “transfer by direct transmission or displacement . . . from one 
utility to another over the facilities of an intermediate utility. . . .” Otter Tail Power Co. v. 
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973). 
 49. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 719. (noting the limiting effect of these inter-
pretations and describing various decisions).  
 50. Id.  
 51. See FOX-PENNER, supra note 18, at 137. 
 52. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776. 
 53. For an in-depth description of the changes effected by the EPAct, see Jeffrey D. 
Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992—A Watershed for Competition 
in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447 (1993). 
 54. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 1279. 
 55. Watkiss & Smith, supra note 53, at 459-60 (citation omitted).  
 56. Id. at 460. 
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ent firms to enter the generation market.57 Specifically, the EPAct 
“removed most of the restrictions on the type of generators that could 
sell deregulated wholesale power.”58 In short, the various provisions 
of the EPAct “accelerated considerably” the transition to restruc-
tured, competitive wholesale markets initiated by PURPA.59 
3.   Mandatory Open Access 
 Progress toward restructuring brought about by PURPA and the 
EPAct culminated in the deregulatory agenda’s most significant 
regulation to date in the electric power industry—Order No. 888.60 
Order No. 888 initiated the unbundling process for transmission and 
generation assets and set in place a system for mandatory open ac-
cess of transmission facilities.61 The open-access requirement, in par-
ticular, has opened competition in wholesale markets, “because now 
a wider range of generators and utilities have access to a networked 
wholesale power grid.”62 Other procompetitive benefits of Order No. 
888 include the divestiture of generation assets by vertically inte-
grated electric power firms, which has caused an increase in competi-
tion amongst firms to provide power at wholesale, and an increase in 
state movements to restructure retail electric power markets.63 
E.   Retail Competition 
 Opening wholesale markets to competition is only part of the on-
going restructuring process in electric power. Retail markets—whose 
regulatory sphere is beyond the purview of federal regulators—are 
also the subject of intense debate in numerous states concerning 
whether, or to what extent, restructuring should take place.64 Under 
a regime of retail competition, “the functional unbundling of trans-
mission from generation and local distribution services would be ex-
                                                                                                                    
 57. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 732. For a detailed description of the pre- 
and post-EPAct regulatory framework, see Watkiss & Smith, supra note 53, at 464-73. 
 58. FOX-PENNER, supra note 18, at 138. 
 59. TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM: RESTRUCTURING 
AMERICA’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 31 (1996). 
 60. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 
1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). 
 61. See Richard P. Bonnifield & Ronald L. Drewnowski, Transmission at a Cross-
roads, 21 ENERGY L.J. 447, 450 (2000); Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case 
Study in Government Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 841 (1998). 
 62. Rossi, supra note 17, at 1280. 
 63. JAMES H. MCGREW, FERC: FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 178 
(2002). 
 64. For a discussion of many of the issues being debated and state-specific examples 
of retail restructuring efforts, see CUSTOMER CHOICE: FINDING VALUE IN RETAIL ELEC-
TRICITY MARKETS (Ahmad Faruqui & J. Robert Malko eds., 1999). 
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tended to separate the local distribution function from retail sales.”65 
Then end users, including residential consumers, would have the 
ability to purchase electricity from the retail firm of their choosing.66 
 Opening retail markets to competition consists primarily of state 
regulatory measures designed to mandate retail wheeling to allow 
supplying firms that own no transmission or distribution facilities in 
a given area to provide service to that area.67 Integrated utilities still 
own transmission and generation facilities in most states and are 
generally unwilling to provide consumers with retail choice.68 The 
goal of retail competition, though, is that every consumer will have a 
choice of retail providers and will be able to choose firms on the basis 
of competitive factors, such as price.69  
 Despite differing regulatory jurisdictions, retail and wholesale 
competition are generally seen as two parts of a competitive whole.70 
Generally, consumers do not currently have the option to select their 
retail providers.71 Thus, despite the opening of wholesale markets—
which presumably results in economic benefits to consumers—
consumers will not realize the full range of benefits from competition 
until retail markets are subject to competition.72  
 Although nearly every state has at least considered opening retail 
markets to competition,73 there are many difficulties involved with 
implementing retail competition.74 Nowhere are these difficulties 
more evident than when examining the aftermath of the California 
                                                                                                                    
 65. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 41-42. 
 66. See id. at 42.  
 67. See MASAYUKI YAJIMA, DEREGULATORY REFORMS OF THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
INDUSTRY 81 (1997). 
 68. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 1281. 
 69. See Richard D. Cudahy, Retail Wheeling: Is this Revolution Necessary?, 15 
ENERGY L.J. 351, 351 (1994) (“Retail wheeling contemplates that every electric power cus-
tomer should be given an opportunity to seek out the lowest cost source of power wherever 
it can be found.”). 
 70. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 1281 (“It is well-recognized that, in order to maximize 
the benefits of competition in wholesale power markets, retail access to competition for all 
customers will be necessary.”). 
 71. See id.  
 72. See id.  
 73. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 872 (“[M]ost . . . states have considered 
moving forward with retail competition, and many have already adopted competition 
plans.”). For a brief description of some of those plans, see id. 
 74. See, e.g., Harry First, Regulated Deregulation: The New York Experience in Elec-
tric Utility Deregulation, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 911 (2002) (noting the difficulties New York 
has encountered while attempting to implement a program of retail competition). Regard-
ing the Kansas plan, one scholar has noted:  
In developing a plan, many legal and non-legal policy issues must be consid-
ered. When non-legal issues are decided, interested entities will be either satis-
fied or dissatisfied with the outcome. In contrast, when legal issues are decided, 
an outcome that is contrary to law or constitutional principles may invalidate 
the entire plan. 
Sonnet C. Edmonds, Retail Electric Competition in Kansas: A Utility Perspective, 37 
WASHBURN L.J. 603, 635 (1998).  
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electricity crisis.75 But the crisis in California has not led to wide-
spread abandonment of proposals to open retail markets to competi-
tion. Instead, the result of the crisis in California is that regulators 
have begun to study the situation to determine how to better imple-
ment retail choice programs in their own states.76 Despite the poten-
tial costs of retail choice programs, their potential benefits will likely 
lead state regulators to continue considering various restructuring 
proposals for their respective states.77 
III.   PRICE SQUEEZE 
A.   Introducing the Price Squeeze 
 A vertically integrated monopolist effectuates a price squeeze on 
second-level competitors, who are also purchasers of the first-level 
monopolized good, when the monopolist’s first-level price is too high 
or second-level price too low for the competing firm to cover its 
costs.78 
 Because the vertically integrated firm is a monopolist at level one, 
the firm operating only in the level-two competitive market has no-
where else to turn for the necessary level-one input. Thus, the price 
at which the vertically integrated firm sells the monopolized good to 
a second-level competitor establishes a cost base for that competi-
tor.79 Likewise, the price at which the vertically integrated firm sells 
its second-level product sets an upper limit on the price its competi-
tor can acquire for that product.80 
 The paradigmatic illustration of a price squeeze comes from the 
factual setting of the claim’s seminal case, United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America (Alcoa).81 Aluminum Company of America (“Al-
                                                                                                                    
 75. For a list of the difficulties experienced by residents of California in the wake of 
the crisis, see Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federal-
ism To Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 1768, 1768-69 (2002). 
 76. See Peter Navarro & Michael Shames, Electricity Deregulation: Lessons Learned 
from California, 24 ENERGY L.J. 33, 64 (2003) (“It is to the learned remembrance of the 
mistakes of California that must serve as lessons for those policymakers who continue to 
participate in the deregulation debate.”). 
 77. For a good discussion of the various costs and benefits associated with retail 
choice programs, see FOX-PENNER, supra note 18, at 291-315. 
 78. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1990); 3A 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 767c, at 126 (2d ed. 2002).  
 79. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, ¶ 767c, at 126 (“The price at which 
[the integrated firm] sells the monopolized raw material or intermediate product puts a 
floor under the costs of the second-stage producers . . . .”). 
 80. Id. (noting that the integrated firm’s “selling price at the second stage puts a ceil-
ing on the prices they can obtain”). 
 81. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Alcoa opinion—written by Judge Hand—is gen-
erally interpreted to stand for the proposition, as it relates to the issue of price squeeze, 
that a price squeeze is effectuated unlawfully by a firm with monopoly power when it 
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coa”), a vertically integrated firm, had monopolized the market for 
ingot, a good sometimes used to produce sheet metal.82 Alcoa was the 
largest participant in the competitive market for the sale of sheet 
metal, but it also sold ingot to firms that would then produce sheet 
metal themselves, thus causing these firms to enter into direct com-
petition with Alcoa.83 The pricing scheme actually alleged in Alcoa is 
more complex than needed for a basic illustration of the price 
squeeze.84 But consider the simplified hypothetical based on the facts 
of Alcoa used by then-Chief Judge Breyer in Town of Concord v. Bos-
ton Edison Co.: 
Suppose, hypothetically, that Alcoa’s price for ingot was $100 per 
ton; that the independents’ costs of fabricating ingot into sheet was 
$50 per ton; and that Alcoa’s price for sheet was $145 per ton. Un-
der these circumstances, the independents, with ingot costs of 
$100 and fabricating costs of $50, would have no “room” to make a 
profit, for they could not charge more than $145 for sheet without 
losing all of their business to Alcoa. Alcoa’s prices of $100 for ingot 
and $145 for sheet would squeeze the independents out of busi-
ness.85 
Although simple, this example illustrates the difficulties raised by a 
claim of price squeeze. As is clear from this definition and illustra-
tion of the price squeeze, there is nothing a priori anticompetitive 
about a squeeze. Instead, properly conceptualized, a price squeeze is 
merely a by-product of vertical integration, the result of which may 
be “adverse, neutral, or beneficial.”86 The key, then, in analyzing any 
price squeeze claim is to unpack the situational and economic factors 
surrounding the allegation. 
 A price squeeze may signal a number of different market or pri-
vate forces or circumstances in operation. As explained by Professors 
Areeda and Hovenkamp, “[a] price squeeze might reflect (1) an ad-
verse change in cost or demand conditions, (2) the elimination of mo-
nopoly profits at the second level, (3) the monopolist’s increased effi-
                                                                                                                    
charges the independent competitor “higher than a ‘fair price’” for the first-level good or 
sets its second-level price too low to allow the independent firm to make “a living profit.” 
Id. at 436-38. Judge Hand’s test has been subject to a host of criticisms, the most obvious 
of which are that the “fair price” standard offers no meaningful guidance to courts and the 
difficulty in determining what, exactly, a “living profit” entails. See, e.g., Town of Concord, 
915 F.2d at 25. For a more detailed criticism of Judge Hand’s test, see AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, ¶ 767d2, at 131. 
 82. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 425 (finding Alcoa’s share of the ingot market to be at ninety 
percent). 
 83. Id. at 436.  
 84. For the pricing scheme alleged in Alcoa, see id. at 437-38. 
 85. 915 F.2d at 18.  
 86. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, ¶ 767c, at 126 (“[I]t is difficult to see any 
competitive significance apart from the consequences of vertical integration itself, which 
may be adverse, neutral, or beneficial.”).  
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ciency, (4) indirect price discrimination, or (5) predatory pricing.”87 
Only the last circumstance—price squeeze as a result of predatory 
pricing—is of great concern to antitrust courts considering a claim of 
price squeeze, and even it may be better conceptualized outside the 
framework of price squeeze.88  
 Three of the circumstances potentially leading to a price 
squeeze—change in cost or demand conditions, elimination of second-
level monopoly profits, and increased efficiency by the integrated 
firm—are procompetitive in nature, and thus should not be con-
demned by antitrust courts.89 Changes in the cost of producing ingot, 
for example, will necessarily squeeze second-level sheet metal pro-
ducers where demand for sheet metal remains constant. Likewise, a 
large increase in demand for sheet metal would raise the demand—
and thus price—for ingot. This set of market circumstances would ef-
fectuate a price squeeze on firms needing ingot for the production of 
end-product goods for which demand remained constant. When the 
market operates in search of competitive balance in this way, the re-
sulting squeeze is of no concern to antitrust courts.90  
 The elimination of second-level monopoly profits is another possi-
ble procompetitive circumstance giving rise to a price squeeze. If the 
second-level firm is a monopolist, a price squeeze effectuated by the 
first-level monopolist on the second-level firm will be procompetitive 
in the sense that the price paid by the end user is likely to fall.91 In 
this circumstance, the second-level firm has “no legitimate claim to 
insulate their monopoly profits from competition, notwithstanding 
the continuation of monopoly profits at the first stage.”92 The first-
level monopolist may be a legitimate target for antitrust attack, but 
the second-level monopolist equipped with only the claim of harm to 
its monopoly via price squeeze is in no position to initiate the chal-
lenge.93  
                                                                                                                    
 87. Id. (footnote omitted).   
 88. This approach is adopted from Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, who note that 
price squeeze as a result of predatory pricing is the only one of the five circumstances giv-
ing rise to a price squeeze claim that “raises a question of unlawful conduct,” while arguing 
that even that claim should not be considered under the price squeeze rubric. Id. Instead, 
Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest that the price squeeze as a predatory pricing 
claim should be analyzed under the jurisprudence of predatory pricing. Id.  
 89. See id. (stating that these three circumstances are “beyond reproach”). 
 90. See id. ¶ 767c1, at 127 (noting that such squeezes “are a normal and proper reflec-
tion of changed market conditions” and pointing out that “in such cases the ‘squeeze’ is 
what corrects the imbalance of supply and demand”). 
 91. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1990) (dis-
cussing the benefit of reduced price to the consumer when a first-level monopolist squeezes 
a second-level monopolist).  
 92. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, ¶ 767c2, at 128.  
 93. See id. (“Whether society chooses to attack the first-stage monopoly is no reason to 
protect second-level monopoly profits from competition by the monopolist.”).  
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 A third potential procompetitive justification for the existence of a 
price squeeze is that the integrated firm is simply more efficient than 
its second-level competitors.94 This overall efficiency advantage may 
be the result of more efficient production of the second-level good, or 
it may simply reflect the firm’s lower costs brought about as a result 
of vertical integration.95 Regardless, the efficiency advantage most 
likely benefits consumers in the form of lower prices.96 
 A fourth possible circumstance giving rise to a claim of price 
squeeze is involvement by the integrated firm in price discrimination 
against its second-level competitors.97 The price discrimination claim 
alleges price differentiation unrelated to cost.98 A finding of price 
squeeze via price discrimination says little about whether the 
squeeze is harmful to consumers.99 From an economic perspective, 
the key question when confronting a price discrimination claim is 
whether the monopolist’s output increased or decreased as a result.100 
Whether antitrust courts condemn price discrimination, then, should 
depend on the outcome of that analysis. As Robert Bork noted: 
If discrimination increases output, it tends to move resource allo-
cation and value of marginal product toward that which would ob-
tain in a competitive industry. A decrease in output has the oppo-
                                                                                                                    
 94. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24. 
 95. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
243 (1993); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, ¶ 767c2, at 128.  
 96. One potential objection to the argument for not attacking this circumstance under 
the law of price squeeze is that the first-level monopolist may extend its monopoly to the 
second level and stifle progress in technological advances or productive efficiency. Profes-
sors Areeda and Hovenkamp respond to this claim by arguing that “such speculative 
losses, which may never materialize, are a poor trade-off for present efficiency gains.” 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, ¶ 767c3, at 128. This response is sound. If ineffi-
cient first-level monopolies develop as a result of an efficiency squeeze at level two, market 
forces should allow for correction via subsequent entry. If the firm engages in potentially 
illegal anticompetitive conduct, that conduct can, of course, be challenged in a normal anti-
trust proceeding. Eliminating competitively formed market efficiency gains out of fear that 
harmful anticompetitive conduct might result at some future time is not justification 
enough to forgo the presently obtained competitive benefits. 
 97. See Lopatka, supra note 7, at 588 (limiting the definition of price squeeze to a 
claim that represents “a form of price discrimination”). 
 98. Professor Lopatka describes the price squeeze via price discrimination claim 
within the context of electric power as “the condition obtaining when the ratio of the pri-
vate utility’s wholesale price to its marginal cost of wholesale service exceeds the ratio of 
the private utility’s retail price to its marginal cost of retail service.” Id. (citation omitted).  
 99. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE 
J. ON REG. 1, 36 (2002) (“[I]t is clear that price discrimination per se cannot be relied on in 
. . . any . . . industry as evidence of market power, which itself warrants intervention, and 
that attempts to stamp it out will ordinarily do more economic harm than good.”). 
 100. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 95, at 395 (recognizing that the important economic 
question when price discrimination is alleged is “whether discrimination expands or fur-
ther restricts the monopolist’s output”). 
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site effect. The impact of discrimination on output, therefore, may 
be taken as a proxy for its effect on consumer welfare.101 
Because there is theoretical support for the proposition that price 
discrimination resulting from vertical integration serves procompeti-
tive ends more often than not,102 courts should look skeptically at any 
claim of price squeeze via price discrimination.103 
 The predatory price squeeze is the final variety of price squeeze 
and is the type of squeeze that is the greatest concern to antitrust 
courts wishing to promote competition. The predatory price squeeze 
draws from the concept of predation generally. Predatory pricing can 
be defined as pricing below cost in order to drive a competing firm 
from the market.104 Pricing below cost is said to be rational from the 
                                                                                                                    
 101. Id.  
 102. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, ¶ 756b5, at 16-17, ¶ 767c5, at 
129. 
 103. At least one court has recognized the tenuous nature of the price squeeze via price 
discrimination claim. Then-Chief Judge Breyer, while not precluding the possibility of rec-
ognizing such a claim, was skeptical of its potential to produce more anticompetitive harm 
than competitive good. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 
1990) (“[W]e believe that other arguments (such as those related to economic price dis-
crimination) tend to be inconclusive in respect to anticompetitive effects.”) 
 104. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 335 (2d ed. 1999) (“In its most orthodox form, ‘predatory 
pricing’ refers to a practice of driving rivals out of business by selling at a price below 
cost.”). It might be argued that an even less innocuous definition of price squeeze is avail-
able. Robert Bork, for example, has defined predation without using cost as a baseline. In-
stead, Bork defines predation “as a firm’s deliberate aggression against one or more rivals 
through the employment of [certain] business practices . . . .” BORK, supra note 95, at 144. 
Under this definition, a simple lowering of prices (even if to a level still above cost) may be 
predatory pricing. It has even been explicitly argued that predatory pricing may occur ab-
sent pricing below cost. See generally, Basil S. Yamey, Predatory Price-Cutting: Notes and 
Comments, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 129 (1972). The classic response to this theory suggests that 
without some cost-based standard for analyzing the claim of predation, there is no way to 
determine what pricing strategy the monopolist should have adopted. See, e.g., ROGER D. 
BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 125 (1985) (“Without some sort of 
cost-based standard, it is very difficult to determine whether this pricing is predatory be-
cause it is not clear how else the monopolist should behave.”). Nonetheless, I do not mean 
to reject the possibility of defining predation absent some conceptualization of cost as a 
baseline. Instead, my use of the term “cost” is simply designed to fall in line with the Su-
preme Court’s practice of using cost as a baseline when considering predatory pricing 
claims. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 
(1993) (stating that “a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a ri-
val’s low prices must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure 
of its rival’s costs”). 
 In addition, by incorporating cost into this Comment’s working definition of predation, I 
do not mean to enter into the debate of which cost-based definition is best. Complicated ar-
guments with respect to properly conceptualizing cost in predation claims abound. The 
seminal article on this topic, Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and 
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975), in-
duced numerous responses. For a brief discussion, see W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS 
OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 285-86 (2d ed. 1995). One interesting article proposing re-
jection of the cost-based models is Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and 
Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977). For a collection of the theoretical literature re-
garding the proper definition of predation, see James E. Meeks, Predatory Behavior as an 
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firm’s perspective if it plans to recoup its short-term losses by charg-
ing monopoly prices after the target firm has exited the market or 
been sufficiently disciplined.105 But the predatory price squeeze—
unlike predation generally—need not involve pricing below cost.106 
Because of the potential complexities surrounding the situational 
factors present in a predatory squeeze, such a squeeze would be diffi-
cult to identify under anything but reasonably constant market con-
ditions.107 For example, without evidence that the integrated firm’s 
price for its second-level good is below some measure of cost, alleged 
squeezes may simply represent the integrated firm’s lower operating 
costs.108 For these reasons, antitrust courts should be highly skeptical 
of any claim alleging predatory price squeeze.109 If the analysis of 
price squeeze claims is lax, the result may harm the central goal of 
antitrust: to foster the growth of competition for the good of consum-
                                                                                                                    
Exclusionary Device in the Emerging Telecommunications Industry, 33 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 125, 127 n.7 (1998). 
 105. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, at 335. (“The predator’s intent—and the only in-
tent that can make predatory pricing rational, profit-maximizing behavior—is to charge 
monopoly prices after rivals have been dispatched or disciplined.”); BORK, supra note 95, at 
144 (arguing that predation “would not be considered profit maximizing except for the ex-
pectation either that (1) rivals will be driven from the market, leaving the predator with a 
market share sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened suffi-
ciently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or threatening”). 
For an argument that firms may engage in predation more often than rational choice the-
ory suggests, see Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a Behaviorally Informed Approach to Anti-
trust Law: The Case of Predatory Pricing, ANTITRUST, Fall 2003, at 52. 
 106. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp offer a useful example: 
Suppose a copper ingot monopolist has vertically integrated into copper pipe; 
that copper pipe is the only end product in which ingot is used; that the long-
run marginal cost of fabricating pipe is $35 but the short-run marginal cost for 
outputs somewhat below most efficient levels is $25; and, finally, that the long-
run profit maximizing price for ingot is $65. The monopolist can raise the ingot 
price to $75, hold the pipe price at $100, and gradually monopolize without loss 
in short-term profits, provided that the monopolist can time the expansion of 
its fabricating capacity in such a way as to match the fall in output by competi-
tors as they curb operations and, as their plants wear out, shut down alto-
gether. In such “ideal” circumstances, the integrated monopolist can avoid 
short-run profit losses by capturing the independent fabricators’ return on in-
vestment. If there are several end products, however, the monopolist cannot 
conduct a “costless” squeeze without integrating forward into all of them. 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, ¶ 767c5, at 129 n.12.  
 107. Id. ¶ 767c5, at 129 (“[P]redatory price squeeze by an integrated supply monopolist 
is extremely hard to identify under other than relatively stable cost and demand condi-
tions.”). 
 108. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, at 301 (“Most alleged price . . . ‘squeezes’ result 
because vertically integrated firms have lower costs than do independent firms who must 
rely on the market. The monopolist who reduces its costs by vertical integration will sell to 
the consumer at a lower price, and independent dealers will be unable to compete.”). 
 109. Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO L.J. 271, 288-89 (arguing 
that predation claims generally should be “regarded with grave skepticism” until antitrust 
courts are better able to separate the “good and bad cases”). 
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ers.110 Where there is anticompetitive conduct lurking under a claim 
of price squeeze, it is probably best addressed within the framework 
of more developed antitrust claims like predatory pricing and refusal 
to deal.111  
B.   The Electric Utility Price Squeeze 
 In the electric power industry, the price squeeze claim “arises 
from the complex relationship between the supplier, the wholesale 
customer, the retail customer, and the federal and state regula-
tors.”112 Specifically, a price squeeze in the electric power industry 
may arise when a vertically integrated utility (operating in both 
wholesale and retail markets) sets wholesale rates higher than retail 
rates in relation to cost.113 In such a case, independent firms that are 
wholesale customers of the integrated monopolist and competitors of 
the monopolist at the retail level may not be able to compete in the 
retail market.114 Although electric power firms’ rates are regulated to 
some extent, a squeeze may arise due to actions of the differing bod-
ies that set or approve the rates: FERC at wholesale and state regu-
latory commissions at retail.115 
                                                                                                                    
 110. On competition and consumer welfare as the central goals of antitrust, see BORK, 
supra note 95, and RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
(1976). 
 111. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, ¶ 767c1, at 127, ¶ 787c3, at 312. 
 112. Lawrence J. Spiwak, Is the Price Squeeze Doctrine Still Viable in Fully-Regulated 
Energy Markets?, 14 ENERGY L.J. 75, 75 (1993).  
 113. See id. at 76. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Lopatka, supra note 7, at 588 (“The possibility of a price squeeze arises be-
cause two agencies are examining a large amount of data, and each separately making 
hundreds of intricate calculations and subjective judgments.”); City of Mishawaka v. Am. 
Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 983-84 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Behind the rate applications there 
are differing regulatory procedures, differing tests and standards to be applied, and differ-
ing accounting principles to be used in the computations. At best, a utility may find itself 
in a legal and practical maze . . . .”). Despite the fact that differing regulatory regimes set 
or approve rates in the electric power industry, there is some cross-comparison of rates. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that FERC, in determining whether a firm’s wholesale rates 
are just and reasonable, “must arrive at a rate level deemed by it to be just and reasonable, 
but in doing so it must consider the tendered allegations that the proposed rates are dis-
criminatory and anticompetitive in effect” when considered in relation to retail rates. Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976). Professor Lopatka has proposed 
having one agency review both wholesale and retail rates to avoid the price squeeze in a 
fully regulated electric power industry. See Lopatka, supra note 7, at 601 (“The most effec-
tive way to eliminate both predatory and innocent but undesirable rate squeezes is to place 
jurisdiction over both wholesale and retail rates in a single agency.”).  The possibility of 
price squeeze is aided by the fact that firms must often wait longer for retail rate approval. 
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d at 983 (“[T]he wholesale rates under federal control go 
into effect automatically without agency approval, but the state retail rates must await 
state approval.”). 
242  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:225 
 
C.   Electric Utility Price Squeeze Cases 
 The modern landscape of the electric utility price squeeze was de-
veloped in two cases decided in the early 1990s: Town of Concord v. 
Boston Edison Co.116 and City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edi-
son Co.117 This is not to say that the theory is well developed in the 
electric power context. The reality is that, although once frequently 
raised in cases concerning electric utilities, the price squeeze claim is 
surprisingly underdeveloped. The Supreme Court has yet to address 
the matter, and lower courts have provided relatively weak signals 
regarding the claim. Even the differences expressed in the two semi-
nal cases concerning the electric utility squeeze are rather minor. 
One similarity, though, is strikingly clear. Courts are quite skeptical 
of allegations of price squeeze in the electric power industry.  
1.   Town of Concord 
 Nowhere is judicial skepticism of the price squeeze claim clearer 
or more forcefully developed than in Town of Concord. In that case, 
defendant Boston Edison, a vertically integrated utility, sold electric-
ity at wholesale to the plaintiffs, who were municipalities and their 
municipally-owned utilities.118 The plaintiffs complained that in-
creases in the defendant’s wholesale rates obtained from FERC were 
not matched by retail rate increases; as a result, wholesale prices 
paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant rose over a three-year period 
while prices charged by the plaintiffs in retail remained constant, re-
sulting in diminished profits.119  
 The First Circuit explicitly held that a government-regulated firm 
with fully regulated prices was not barred from requesting rate 
changes that might result in a price squeeze.120 In effect, though, the 
First Circuit’s reasoning all but foreclosed the possibility of finding a 
firm with fully regulated rates liable under section 2 of the Sherman 
Act121 for effectuating a prize squeeze.122 The court’s initial reasoning 
                                                                                                                    
 116. 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 117. 955 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 118. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 20.  
 119. Id. at 20-21. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the squeeze would result in 
their “mak[ing] less money.” Id. at 21.  
 120. Id. at 19. 
 121. Liability for violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act is premised on a finding of 
market power in the relevant market and the existence of “conduct designed to acquire, 
maintain, or extend the monopoly.” Lopatka, supra note 7, at 610. For a detailed discussion 
of how these principles apply in the context of electric power, see id. at 609-17. 
 122. One commentator has reported the opinion as having “held that price squeezes do 
not constitute [section] 2 violations in the regulated industry context.” STEPHEN F. ROSS, 
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 83 (1993). Ross explains this characterization in a footnote: 
“Although the court limited its holding by saying that price squeezes would not ‘normally’ 
be exclusionary, its analysis effectively bars successful prosecution of [section] 2 claims of 
municipally-owned electric companies against integrated sources of wholesale power.” Id. 
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noted that a fully regulated industry “diminishes the likelihood of 
‘entry barrier’ harm, namely the risk that (1) prices will rise because 
(2) new firms will hesitate to enter a market and compete after (3) a 
squeeze has driven pre-existing independent competitors from the 
marketplace.”123 Related to this argument against finding price 
squeeze liability in the electric power context, the court noted that 
regulators generally have authority to determine whether a new firm 
will enter the market.124 If a firm is allowed to enter, the court con-
tinued, the regulators are unlikely to allow an integrated monopolist 
to drive the independent firm from the market by charging supra-
competitive prices or refusing to deal.125 
 The First Circuit next displayed its skepticism of the price 
squeeze by touting a potentially procompetitive justification for the 
alleged squeeze. Specifically, the court noted that because “regulators 
try to set prices that reflect costs,” any squeeze effectuated by an in-
tegrated monopolist is likely to reflect that monopolist’s ability to op-
erate more efficiently than its independent competitor.126 Thus, the 
court concluded, “a rule preventing prices that create a squeeze will 
more likely discourage efficient operations and deprive consumers of 
prices that reflect lower costs.”127 
 The court’s reasoning, combined with its emphasis on potentially 
procompetitive explanations for an alleged squeeze, suggests that the 
First Circuit is not merely skeptical of price squeeze claims but also 
that the claim is all but foreclosed as the sole basis for finding a 
Sherman Act section 2 violation in a fully regulated industry. The 
court further hinted at this conclusion by stating that “a price 
squeeze in a fully regulated industry such as electricity will not nor-
mally constitute ‘exclusionary conduct’ under Sherman Act [section] 
2.”128 To be sure, the court was careful to include the modifier “nor-
                                                                                                                    
at 83 n.26. One might plausibly argue that this reasoning can be extended beyond the al-
leged squeeze involving municipally-owned utilities on one side to include any firm that is 
both a customer of the integrated firm in the wholesale power market and a competitor in 
the retail market.  
 123. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 25. 
 124. Id. at 26. 
 125. Id. As the court stated:  
For another thing, factors related to regulation, such as the economic ability of 
a market to support new entry, or the legal requirement that a firm secure 
permission to enter, are likelier to determine new entry into a regulated indus-
try than is a new entrant’s fear of a two-level monopolist’s enhanced retaliatory 
power. After all, should the regulator decide that new entry is warranted, it 
typically has the legal authority to prevent an existing “two-level” monopolist 
from improperly disadvantaging a new “second-level” competitor by, say, refus-
ing to deal with it or by charging unreasonably high prices. 
Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 28.  
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mally,”129 but again, the reasoning makes clear that it would require 
rare factual circumstances before the court would find a firm liable 
for a Sherman Act section 2 violation on the theory of price squeeze.  
2.   City of Anaheim 
 In City of Anaheim, the Ninth Circuit concurred with the First 
Circuit’s skepticism of the price squeeze claim in a fully regulated 
industry such as electric power but rejected that court’s apparent 
foreclosure of the claim.130 Rather than adopt the First Circuit’s dis-
missive and conclusive tone regarding the claim, the Ninth Circuit 
settled for protecting potentially procompetitive conduct in price 
squeeze cases by focusing its analysis on the question of whether the 
integrated monopolist had “specific intent” to engage in anticompeti-
tive conduct.131  
 Despite providing more lenient rhetoric than the First Circuit in 
Town of Concord, the Ninth Circuit remained skeptical that such a 
claim could be proven in the face of the potential procompetitive jus-
tifications for an alleged squeeze.132 And although numerous courts 
have remained open to the possibility of finding firms liable under a 
theory of price squeeze in a fully regulated industry like electric 
power,133 the claim is almost uniformly looked upon with great skep-
ticism.134 So pervasive is this skepticism that it has led one commen-
tator, after engaging in an extensive review of price squeeze cases 
arising in the electric power industry, to conclude that the claim, 
“[w]hile not outright abolished . . . appears to have lost much, if not 
all, of its bite.”135 
                                                                                                                    
 129. The court even emphasized the modifier again: “[W]e have limited our holding by 
stating that ‘normally’ a price squeeze will not constitute an exclusionary practice in the 
context of a fully regulated monopoly, thereby leaving cases involving exceptional circum-
stances for another day.” Id. at 29.  
 130. See City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“We . . . would be reluctant to hold that a mere showing that a squeeze developed would 
suffice to cause antitrust liability. However, we do not think that one must react as force-
fully against the theory as the court did in Town of Concord in order to prevent that re-
sult.”). 
 131. Id. The court elaborated on how a plaintiff might meet its evidentiary burden un-
der this standard, noting “that the specific intent need not be proved by direct admissions 
of wrongdoing. Rather, the actions of the utility, taken as a whole, can and should be con-
sidered.” Id.  
 132. The court in City of Anaheim did not itself find a violation of section 2 under the 
price squeeze theory. See id. at 1379. 
 133. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982); City 
of Groton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1981); City of Mishawaka v. 
Am. Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 134. Cases post-Town of Concord have echoed its great skepticism regarding the price 
squeeze claim. See, e.g., City of Anaheim v. FERC, 941 F.2d 1234, 1250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 135. Spiwak, supra note 112, at 93. 
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IV.   PRICE SQUEEZE IN A DEREGULATED ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 
 This Part examines the claim of price squeeze in the deregulatory 
environment that has encapsulated the electric power industry in re-
cent years. The first Section discusses the industry’s move away from 
cost-of-service rate regulation for wholesale transactions to wholesale 
deregulation by allowing firms meeting certain conditions to leave 
the pricing of their wholesale electricity service to market-driven 
forces. The second Section introduces the doctrine of primary juris-
diction and describes the role it might play—in conjunction with the 
use of market-based ratemaking for wholesale transactions—in anti-
trust cases alleging price squeeze. This Part then addresses a poten-
tial objection to the use of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in price 
squeeze cases arising in a deregulated electric power industry. Fi-
nally, this Part questions whether there is any role left for the claim 
in the context of electric power.  
A.   Market-Based Rates 
 Rate-of-return regulation has been subjected to a good deal of 
criticism. Chief among this criticism is the model of “regulatory bias” 
set forth by Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson.136 In essence, 
Averch and Johnson posited that reliance on rate-of-return regula-
tion would result in firms inefficiently substituting capital for other 
inputs.137 Whether the “A-J Effect”, as Averch and Johnson’s hy-
pothesis has come to be called, is actually present in the electric 
power industry is subject to some debate.138 Regardless, the lesson 
that has been drawn from discussion of the A-J Effect is that perva-
                                                                                                                    
 136. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Con-
straint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
 137. Averch and Johnson summarily stated the matter in the introduction to their pa-
per: 
[A] “regulatory bias” operates in the following manner: (1) The firm does not 
equate marginal rates of factor substitution to the ratio of factor costs; there-
fore the firm operates inefficiently in the sense that (social) cost is not mini-
mized at the output it selects. (2) The firm has an incentive to expand into 
other regulated markets, even if it operates at a (long-run) loss in these mar-
kets; therefore, it may drive out other firms, or discourage their entry into 
these other markets, even though the competing firms may be lower-cost pro-
ducers. 
Id. at 1052. For a thorough but simplified economic analysis of the A-J effect, see VISCUSI 
ET AL., supra note 104, at 387-91. 
 138. See Hammond, supra note 35, at 53 (discussing empirical findings in support of 
and refuting the actual presence of the A-J Effect); VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 104, at 390 
(noting the difficulty of testing the A-J Effect empirically and citing literature finding both 
the presence and absence of the A-J Effect in the electric power industry). If, in fact, the A-
J Effect is present in the electric power industry, it may even have beneficial effects. See 
id. at 391 (suggesting that technological advancement might be one beneficial effect arising 
from the substitution of capital for other inputs).  
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sive regulatory schemes often fail in their attempts to facilitate in-
dustry operations as if they were subject to market forces.139 
 The potential inefficiencies associated with cost-of-service rate-
making have led federal and—to a lesser but growing extent—state 
regulators to experiment with different ratemaking methods. There 
is no statutory language at the federal level requiring regulators to 
partake in cost-of-service ratemaking. The Federal Power Act simply 
prescribes baseline standards requiring that rates be “just and rea-
sonable”140 and not “preferential.”141 Taking advantage of the flexibil-
ity afforded by the just-and-reasonable standard, regulators have in-
creasingly been experimenting with market-based ratemaking in an 
attempt to more closely mimic competitive markets in electric 
power.142 
 Despite the regulatory leeway provided by the just-and-reasonable 
standard, it is clear that FERC does not have the authority to simply 
leave the setting of rates entirely to market forces. In Farmers Union 
Central Exchange, Inc. v. FERC,143 the D.C. Circuit rejected an at-
tempt by FERC to subject oil pipeline ratemaking to competitive 
forces constrained by price caps set high enough to ensnare only fla-
grantly noncompetitive rates.144 In addition to reaffirming the neces-
sity of setting rates within the bounds set forth by the just-and-
reasonable standard—bounds now clearly violated at the margin by 
relying on market-based rates subject only to high price caps—the 
D.C. Circuit made clear that FERC was imbued with responsibility 
under the Federal Power Act to actively monitor rates to ensure they 
remain within a zone of reasonableness.145 
 In the electric power industry, use of market-based ratemaking 
has proceeded incrementally. In Citizens Power & Light Corp.,146 
FERC approved market-based rates for a power marketer that owned 
                                                                                                                    
 139. See Hammond, supra note 35, at 54 (suggesting that “the A-J debate is a further 
illustration of how extremely difficult it is to mimick [sic] the competitive market via regu-
latory fiat”).  
 140. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2000).  
 141. Id. § 824e(a). 
 142. There is some question in the literature as to whether the Federal Power Act can 
support market-based ratemaking by FERC. Compare Gerald Norlander, May the FERC 
Rely on Markets to Set Electric Rates?, 24 ENERGY L.J. 65 (2003) (concluding that FERC 
does not have authority under the Federal Power Act to engage in market-based rate-
making), with Michael J. Gergen et al., Market-Based Ratemaking and the Western Energy 
Crisis of 2000 and 2001, 24 ENERGY L.J. 321 (2003) (concluding that FERC does have au-
thority under the Federal Power Act to engage in market-based ratemaking). This Article 
is agnostic on the legality of FERC engaging in market-based ratemaking under the Fed-
eral Power Act. All that matters for purposes of this Article is that FERC is currently us-
ing the market-based ratemaking standard in the electric power industry.  
 143. 734 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 144. Id. at 1507. 
 145. Id. at 1509-10. 
 146. 48 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,210 (1989). 
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neither transmission nor generation facilities, lacked market power, 
and was not engaged in self-dealing.147 In approving the use of mar-
ket-based rates, FERC recognized potential procompetitive benefits 
and touted the likelihood that the rate-setting scheme would serve as 
an accurate proxy for operation in a competitive market:  
 Allowing Citizens Power the pricing flexibility it requests would 
undoubtedly permit it to respond quickly to changing market con-
ditions and to be more effective. Pricing flexibility would also help 
to ensure that prices accurately reflect market conditions of scar-
city or abundance and, to the extent it allows Citizens Power to 
succeed, it would further the Commission’s statutory goals of pro-
moting efficiency and coordination.148 
Despite the purported efficiency gains in allowing for market-based 
rates, FERC recognized the potential for danger should a firm sub-
ject to market-based rates begin to engage in self-dealing or acquire 
market power.149 To ensure the procompetitive benefits of market-
based ratemaking were not usurped by anticompetitive tendencies, 
FERC levied three conditions on the approval of the new rate-setting 
standard. First, the firm in question was not allowed to own any 
transmission facility, affiliate with a firm that owned any transmis-
sion facility, or affiliate with a firm that held a franchised service 
area.150 Second, the firm was to make filings regarding its contracts 
for the sale and purchase of generation and transmission contracts 
for review by FERC as a measure to ensure the firm was not obtain-
ing significant market power.151 Third, as an additional device to en-
sure against the obtainment of significant market power, FERC 
                                                                                                                    
 147. Id. ¶¶ 61,776-77. According to FERC, “[s]elf-dealing occurs when a marketer sells 
to or buys from an affiliate on terms that are more favorable than those that would be 
available to other market participants.” Id. ¶ 61,777.  
 148. Id. ¶ 61,777. 
 149. See id. (“While allowing pricing flexibility to Citizens Power can produce benefits, 
however, there are two potential abuses which we must guard against: self-dealing and the 
exercise of market power.”). 
 150. Id. ¶ 61,778. 
 151. Id. FERC was clear that guarding against the obtainment of significant market 
power was a primary concern. A host of conditions were placed on the filing documents 
pertaining to the contracts: 
For each purchase contract and sale contract, Citizens Power should provide 
the following information: the buyer’s or seller’s name; a brief description of the 
service, including degree of firmness; the delivery points for each service; the 
price of each service; the quantities to be served or purchased; the contract’s 
duration; the buyer’s certification that it is paying a rate at or below its ex-
pected cost of alternative electric power; and any other attributes of the product 
being purchased or sold which contribute to its market value. Citizens Power 
shall file this contract information quarterly as to all contracts signed within 
the time period. Citizens Power must file this information within thirty days of 
the end of each quarterly period. 
Id.  
248  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:225 
 
noted that the public would be allowed to file complaints against the 
firm alleging the existence of market power.152 
 FERC opened the door to widespread use of market-based rate-
making in 1994, with its opinion in Heartland Energy Services, Inc.153 
In Heartland, FERC, for the first time, approved the setting of mar-
ket-based rates for an affiliate of a vertically integrated utility with 
ownership over generation and transmission facilities.154 Heartland 
also clarified the applicable framework for determining whether a 
particular firm is eligible to obtain rate approval based on market 
standards or maintain rates based on market standards: 
 The Commission’s general standard is to allow market-based 
rates if the seller (and each of its affiliates) does not have, or has 
adequately mitigated, market power in generation and transmis-
sion and cannot erect other barriers to entry. In addition, the 
Commission considers whether there is evidence of affiliate abuse 
or reciprocal dealing. In evaluating specific transactions (e.g., in-
dependent power producers selling their entire output under a 
long-term contract), the Commission examines the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction against these standards. In evaluat-
ing requests for open-ended, market rate authority, the Commis-
sion uses these same general standards but also implements re-
porting and periodic review requirements because it will not have 
the opportunity to examine the particular circumstances of each 
transaction.155 
Thus, to obtain approval under the market-based standard, a firm 
must show that it does not have significant market power over 
transmission or generation. If the firm does have market power, it 
must mitigate that market power to a threshold degree acceptable to 
FERC. The firm must also not have erected any significant barriers 
to entry, or have engaged in any “affiliate abuse or reciprocal deal-
ing.”156 Finally, firms are subject to continual oversight by FERC to 
ensure these standards are not violated.157 
                                                                                                                    
 152. Id. ¶ 61,779. 
 153. 68 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,223 (1994). 
 154. Id. ¶ 62,060. 
 155. Id. ¶¶ 62,060-61. 
 156. Id. ¶ 62,060. 
 157. FERC required the following from Heartland to comply with the oversight of the 
market-based regime:  
We thus direct Heartland to inform the Commission promptly of any change in 
status that would reflect a departure from the characteristics the Commission 
has relied upon in approving market-based pricing. These include but are not 
limited to: (1) ownership of generation or transmission facilities or inputs to 
electric power production other than fuel supplies; (2) affiliation with any en-
tity other than WP&L that owns generation or transmission facilities or inputs 
to electric power production, or affiliation with another entity (other than 
WP&L) that has a franchised service area; or (3) business and financial ar-
rangements in the United States, Canada, Puerto Rico, or Mexico involving 
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 At first glance, it appears that the increasing use of market-based 
ratemaking in electric power will increase the likelihood that inte-
grated firms will be able to successfully effectuate a price squeeze on 
rivals. This is because the market-based rates are not subject to the 
same type of regulatory scrutiny that cost-of-service regulation has 
been held to. But one key feature of the market-based ratemaking 
process suggests that it will be unlikely that firms will be able to 
take advantage of the differing ratemaking procedure to effectuate a 
price squeeze. In order for firms to have market-based rates ap-
proved, they must demonstrate an absence of significant market 
power. As long as regulators remain steadfast in keeping a watch on 
market power, firms are unlikely to be able to take advantage of re-
laxed ratemaking procedures in order to effectuate a price squeeze, 
because without market power it would be increasingly difficult to ef-
fectuate a squeeze. The opening of wholesale markets to competition 
also makes it less likely that an integrated firm will effectuate a 
squeeze. With open-access transmission now the norm in electric 
power, should a firm attempt a squeeze on a wholesale customer, 
that customer would have competitive options. For example, the 
squeezed firm might wheel power from another supplier or build 
transmission lines to another supplier.  
B.   Primary Jurisdiction 
 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judge-made rule of con-
struction that allocates decisionmaking authority between federal 
courts and agencies when the two share jurisdictional authority.158 
                                                                                                                    
Heartland or any entity affiliated with Heartland and the entities that buy 
from or sell power to Heartland. We also direct Heartland to notify the Com-
mission if it sells to, purchases from, or obtains transmission from a utility that 
has any business relationship with any of Heartland’s affiliates, including 
WP&L. 
Id. ¶ 62,066. Since Heartland, FERC has granted the option of updated market analysis 
reports every three years subject to the understanding that FERC may require such a re-
port at any time. See Delmarva Power & Light Co., 76 F.E.R.C. ¶¶ 61,331, 62,584 (1996). 
Moreover, FERC now requires firms with rates set under the market-based standard to file 
quarterly reports on wholesale power sales made during the relevant period. Revised Pub-
lic Utility Filing Requirements, Order No. 2001, 67 FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,127 (2002), 
reh’g denied, Order No. 2001-A, 100 FERC ¶ 61,074 (2002), reh’g denied, Order No. 2001-B, 
100 FERC ¶ 61,342 (2002); see also Order No. 2001-F, 106 F.E.R.C. ¶¶ 61,060, 61,193 
(2004).  
On April 25, 2002, the Commission issued Order No. 2001, a Final Rule estab-
lishing revised public utility filing requirements. The rule requires public utili-
ties to electronically file quarterly reports (Electric Quarterly Reports) summa-
rizing specified pertinent data about their currently effective contracts (con-
tract data) and data about wholesale power sales they made during the report-
ing period (transaction data). 
Id. ¶ 61,060. 
 158. 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶ 245c, at 93 (2000) (“As a basic premise, 
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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is temporal in nature rather 
than strictly authoritative with respect to ultimate decisionmaking 
power. Courts invoking the doctrine do so to delay action until the 
agency has had an opportunity to consider the issue; however, they 
retain the ultimate authority to decide the issue before them.159 The 
principal jurisprudential basis for invoking the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction is to promote uniformity by affording deference to expert 
agencies charged with oversight of the relevant regulatory regime.160 
By relying on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts are able to 
take advantage of agency expertise, which better allows for the facili-
tation of “accommodation between the antitrust and the regulatory 
regimes.”161 The doctrine is sufficiently broad, though, so as to allow 
courts to make differing determinations than the expert agency, 
should the facts before them so warrant.162 
 The potential applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
to price squeeze claims in the context of electric power has long been 
recognized. Professor Lopatka, for example, has written that “[i]t is 
difficult to imagine a more appropriate case for the exercise of pri-
mary jurisdiction based on agency expertise than the utility price 
squeeze.”163 He also noted that 
a court may not be able to determine whether a price squeeze ex-
ists without expert assistance. Identification of a price squeeze re-
quires an analysis of price and cost. With respect to most com-
modities, identical units manufactured by the same producer will 
have the same costs, so that identification of a squeeze will focus 
on price. The cost of electricity, however, varies on the basis of a 
                                                                                                                    
the purpose of the ‘primary jurisdiction’ doctrine is to allocate decision-making power be-
tween two different departments of the federal government: the courts on the one hand 
and the regulatory agencies of the executive branch on the other.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 7, at 607; Andrew G. Humphrey, Comment, Anti-
trust Jurisdiction and Remedies in an Electric Utility Price Squeeze, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1090, 1105 (1985).  
 160. The Supreme Court noted: 
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particu-
lar agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are 
more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpret-
ing the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better 
equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, 
and by more flexible procedure. 
Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952). 
 161. Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 307 (1973).  
 162. See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a De-
regulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1650-53 (2003) (discussing the flexibility of primary 
jurisdiction, Rossi notes that it offers courts a promising way to confront the challenge of 
applying the antitrust laws in regulated industries while also recognizing its ability to 
leave key decisionmaking authority in the hands of courts). 
 163. Lopatka, supra note 7, at 607. 
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myriad of factors, and FERC is infinitely more adept at assessing 
these factors than a court.164 
 Courts have not consistently shared Professor Lopatka’s enthusi-
asm for the applicability of primary jurisdiction to the electric power 
price squeeze claim. Some courts have found FERC’s institutional 
expertise relevant in examining the claim of price squeeze.165 Other 
courts, however, have refused to defer to FERC on the basis of 
agency expertise or notions of uniformity when examining the elec-
tric utility price squeeze.166 The next Section examines the applicabil-
ity of primary jurisdiction to the price squeeze claim in a deregulated 
electric power industry.  
C.   Institutional Competence 
 As wholesale deregulation and open-access transmission become 
the norm in electric power, the price squeeze claim will take on a dif-
ferent shape than in the past. While the price squeeze has dimin-
ished as a viable cause of action in the electric power industry after 
Town of Concord and other unsympathetic judicial opinions rendered 
the claim, at best, a shot in the dark, deregulation may bring about 
an increase in price squeeze claims due to changing industry charac-
teristics that distinguish present situational factors from those faced 
by courts analyzing the claim in a more fully regulated industry.167 
Where there is market power in transmission and market-based 
rates have not been implemented, or where deregulatory efforts are 
otherwise not in play, courts will most likely continue to adhere to 
the framework for analyzing the squeeze developed in cases like 
Town of Concord. Where deregulatory efforts are apparent, though, 
and the question before antitrust courts concerns a price squeeze 
brought about by wholesale rates set under FERC’s market-based 
standard, antitrust courts will be faced with a new set of issues.  
 As discussed previously, before a firm is eligible for ratemaking 
under the market-based standard it must show that it does not have 
significant market power. Moreover, the petitioning firm—if its re-
quest is granted—must meet compliance standards and remain in a 
close working relationship with FERC so that the agency can deter-
mine whether the firm acquires significant market power post-rate 
approval—an event that would then render the firm an inappropri-
                                                                                                                    
 164. Id. at 607-08 (emphasis and footnote omitted).  
 165. See Humphrey, supra note 159, at 1105. 
 166. See City of Mishawaka v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314, 1321-24 (7th Cir. 
1977).  
 167. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California re-
cently refused to find that Pacific Gas and Electric Company engaged in a price squeeze in 
the deregulated environment. See In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 295 B.R. 635 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 2003).  
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ate benefactor of market-based ratemaking. If a firm’s wholesale 
rates set under a market-based standard are challenged as part of a 
claim of price squeeze, a court may find invoking the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction a useful measure to help guide it in determining 
whether a predatory price squeeze—that is, a price squeeze that an-
titrust courts should condemn—is at play. As a Sherman Act section 
2 claim, antitrust liability for price squeeze is premised first on a 
finding of market power.168 If the defendant firm does not have mar-
ket power, it cannot be liable for price squeeze.  
 Because FERC approval of an application for market-based rates 
is conditioned on a finding that the firm does not have market power, 
and continued use of market-based rates is conditioned on ongoing 
evidence that the firm in question lacks market power, courts will 
most likely find it useful to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion and defer, at least to some extent, to the agency’s determination 
that the firm in question lacked market power. Presumably, under 
FERC’s stated decisional guidelines for determining whether a firm 
is eligible to have its rates set using market-based standards, the 
agency makes detailed and credible findings of whether a particular 
firm possesses market power before allowing a firm to use market-
based rates. 
 Recently, at least one commentator has questioned whether FERC 
enjoys the institutional competence to make a market power deter-
mination when considering a particular firm’s eligibility for market-
based rates. Using California’s deregulation failures as a backdrop, 
this commentator has argued: 
These “market-based” tariffs were new to FERC and dramatically 
different from the fixed “cost-of-service” tariffs with which FERC 
had the most experience. Indeed, FERC’s cursory analysis of these 
new tariffs hints at the Agency’s inexperience; it analyzed these 
applications solely by looking at the market share of each WEG, 
and being satisfied there was insufficient market share to manipu-
late the market, approved the applications. Unlike “cost-of-service” 
rates, FERC never evaluated a fixed number under its “just and 
reasonable” standard, but instead approved a process by which the 
WEGs would sell wholesale electricity in California.169 
In addition to providing only a “cursory analysis” of market power 
during and after a firm’s application for market-based rates, it may 
be that “FERC lacks meaningful experience with deregulated, com-
petitive electricity markets due to its concentration on the highly 
                                                                                                                    
 168. See supra note 121.  
 169. Robert B. Martin, III, Note, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust En-
forcement in the California Electricity Crisis, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 298 (2003) (footnotes 
omitted).  
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regulated markets of the past.”170 If so, courts will not want to blindly 
defer to the agency’s market power determinations. But the doctrine 
of primary jurisdiction is not premised on blind deference to the de-
terminations of supposedly expert agencies. Conceptualized properly, 
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction can be invoked as a decision-
making guide whereby courts use their accumulated judgment to 
glean that information deserving of deference and special considera-
tion from uninformed and unsubstantiated findings. In the case of 
FERC’s review of market-based rate applications, it is quite unlikely 
that any existing inexperience or lack of expertise will continue far 
into the future. As FERC receives internal and external feedback and 
gains experience administering market-based rates, courts will in-
creasingly be able to rely on its findings as valuable decisional guide-
posts. 
D.   Whither the Price Squeeze? 
 As a matter of economic theory, the claim of price squeeze as anti-
competitive conduct is tenuous. A price squeeze may be grounded in 
procompetitive conduct or conduct otherwise not properly within the 
purview of the antitrust laws.171 Antitrust courts must be cautious 
when examining the theory to ensure its application does not result 
in harm to competition and conduct generally beneficial to consum-
ers. Given the complex economic underpinnings of the claim, the best 
option may be to abolish the theory as an antitrust cause of action 
where theories that have been better developed are able to serve as a 
framework of analysis for the conduct at issue. To the extent this is 
not possible or not likely in electric power, antitrust courts should 
continue to adhere to the skeptical approach to the claim advanced in 
Town of Concord and its progeny.  
 As wholesale deregulation and industry restructuring become the 
norm in electric power, antitrust courts will face new issues when 
examining the price squeeze claim. Perhaps of greatest interest is 
that a firm engaged in market-based ratemaking in wholesale trans-
actions will have had to convince FERC that it lacks market power, 
and it will be required to continually show the absence of market 
power by making continuing filings with the agency. To the extent 
FERC’s market power determinations are accurate, the employment 
of market-based ratemaking forecloses the applicability of price 
squeeze as a Sherman Act section 2 violation.172 Antitrust courts con-
                                                                                                                    
 170. Id. at 306.  
 171. See supra Part III. 
 172. Other defenses may be available to defendant firms alleged to have effectuated a 
price squeeze. Although a complete discussion of how these defenses might apply in a de-
regulated electric power industry is beyond the scope of this Comment, examples of poten-
tial defenses include state action immunity and Noerr-Pennington immunity. See Lopatka, 
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sidering the claim of price squeeze effectuated by a firm engaged in 
wholesale transactions at market-based rates will want to take ad-
vantage of FERC’s findings and determinations on the market power 
issue, and may do so by invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
as a measure of deference to FERC as an expert decisionmaking body 
on the issue of market power in the electric power industry. It has 
been suggested that FERC currently remains inexperienced in this 
mode. If so, courts will not want to blindly defer to FERC with re-
spect to its market power determinations. As FERC gains experience 
with administering market-based rates, courts will find it easier to 
rely on FERC’s findings and determinations. As deference to FERC 
increases over time, the price squeeze claim will likely lose much of 
its bite in cases concerned with wholesale rates set under market-
based standards pursuant to approval and continual oversight by 
FERC.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The transition from wholesale cost-of-service regulation to whole-
sale deregulation changes the landscape of applicability of the theory 
of price squeeze to the electric power industry. In the deregulatory 
environment, a firm must show that it does not possess market 
power before it is allowed to take advantage of the regulatory flexibil-
ity imbued by market-based rate-setting standards. If FERC’s initial 
determination and continuing judgment that a firm lacks market 
power is accurate, it is unlikely that a firm using market-based rates 
in the sale of electricity at wholesale will be able to effectuate a price 
squeeze. As a matter of law, the familiar vehicle for bringing price 
squeeze claims—section 2 of the Sherman Act—requires first show-
ing that a firm has market power in order to move forward with a 
substantive claim. Thus, an accurate showing that market power is 
absent appears to virtually foreclose a firm from being found liable 
for violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act under a theory of price 
squeeze.  
 Antitrust courts examining the theory of price squeeze where 
open-access transmission increases competitive options and whole-
sale rate deregulation suggests that the firm in question does not 
possess market power should embrace the doctrine of primary juris-
diction. Embracing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction assumes a 
degree of deference to FERC as an expert decision-making body that 
is able to analyze applicable structural and situational forces in the 
electric power industry to properly determine whether a particular 
                                                                                                                    
supra note 7, at 617-35; Keith A. Rowley, Note, Immunity from Regulatory Price Squeeze 
Claims: From Keogh, Parker, and Noerr to Town of Concord and Beyond, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
399 (1991).  
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firm has market power. To the extent FERC’s experience and exper-
tise in this mode have been accurately questioned, it should be re-
membered that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not require 
blind deference to the judgments of an agency. Courts ultimately re-
tain final authority under the doctrine and presumably are able to 
appropriately discount an agency’s findings if confronted with evi-
dence that its decisionmaking processes or other situational factors 
make it prone to error. As FERC gains experience with implementing 
its market-based rate standards, it will likely produce judgments 
concerning the existence of market power that are of higher quality 
and of better use to antitrust courts considering the issue of price 
squeeze.  
 To the extent market power in transmission and continued use of 
cost-of-service ratemaking in this area remain prevalent, the skepti-
cal approach to the price squeeze claim proffered by Town of Concord 
and its progeny remains the favored course of analysis to avoid chill-
ing procompetitive conduct or preventing practices that are other-
wise outside the scope of condemnation under the antitrust laws. But 
to the extent wholesale deregulation is relevant in future price 
squeeze cases arising in the context of electric power, courts should 
be even more skeptical of the claim given FERC’s already existing 
determination that the firm in question lacked market power. Com-
bined with the skeptical conceptualization of the price squeeze ad-
vanced by Town of Concord and its progeny, further justifications for 
skepticism of the claim advanced by theoretical work grounded in 
economics, and evidence that market power is nonexistent, the price 
squeeze claim is almost certainly a losing one in a deregulated elec-
tric power industry when a firm has been granted the ability, by 
FERC, to partake in the setting of wholesale rates using market-
based standards. While recent developments in electric power do not 
signal the death of the price squeeze as a viable antitrust cause of ac-
tion, it is increasingly unlikely that it will serve as a successful vehi-
cle for plaintiffs in antitrust suits against electric power firms in an 
era of deregulation.  
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